From 378d4ce7552df580e3ddd89c2faa9f8c5086d646 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Uros Majstorovic Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 06:25:38 +0100 Subject: renamed crypto -> ext --- ext/libressl/crypto/aead/Makefile | 13 + ext/libressl/crypto/aead/e_chacha20poly1305.c | 395 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 408 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ext/libressl/crypto/aead/Makefile create mode 100644 ext/libressl/crypto/aead/e_chacha20poly1305.c (limited to 'ext/libressl/crypto/aead') diff --git a/ext/libressl/crypto/aead/Makefile b/ext/libressl/crypto/aead/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6bf1ccf --- /dev/null +++ b/ext/libressl/crypto/aead/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +include ../../ssl_common.mk + +obj = e_chacha20poly1305.o + + +all: $(obj) +dep: all + +%.o: %.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $< + +clean: + rm -f *.o *.a diff --git a/ext/libressl/crypto/aead/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/ext/libressl/crypto/aead/e_chacha20poly1305.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d8291e --- /dev/null +++ b/ext/libressl/crypto/aead/e_chacha20poly1305.c @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.21 2019/03/27 15:34:01 jsing Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floter + * Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) + +//#include +//#include +#include +#include + +//#include "evp_locl.h" +#define EVPerror(X) ; + +#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16 + +#define CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN 4 +#define CHACHA20_IV_LEN 8 +#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN (CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN + CHACHA20_IV_LEN) +#define XCHACHA20_NONCE_LEN 24 + +#if 0 +struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx { + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char tag_len; +}; + +static int +aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) +{ + struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx; + + if (tag_len == 0) + tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN; + + if (tag_len > POLY1305_TAG_LEN) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + /* Internal error - EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */ + if (key_len != sizeof(c20_ctx->key)) + return 0; + + c20_ctx = malloc(sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx)); + if (c20_ctx == NULL) + return 0; + + memcpy(&c20_ctx->key[0], key, key_len); + c20_ctx->tag_len = tag_len; + ctx->aead_state = c20_ctx; + + return 1; +} + +static void +aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) +{ + struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state; + + freezero(c20_ctx, sizeof(*c20_ctx)); +} + +#endif + +static void +poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) +{ + size_t j = data_len; + unsigned char length_bytes[8]; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) { + length_bytes[i] = j; + j >>= 8; + } + + if (data != NULL) + CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len); + CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes)); +} + +static void +poly1305_update_with_pad16(poly1305_state *poly1305, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) +{ + static const unsigned char zero_pad16[16]; + size_t pad_len; + + CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len); + + /* pad16() is defined in RFC 7539 2.8.1. */ + if ((pad_len = data_len % 16) == 0) + return; + + CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, zero_pad16, 16 - pad_len); +} + +int +aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) +{ + unsigned char poly1305_key[32]; + poly1305_state poly1305; + const unsigned char *iv; + const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len; + uint64_t ctr; + + /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block + * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow + * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time. + * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only + * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false. + * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop + * the warning. */ + if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + if (max_out_len < in_len + tag_len) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + + if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + ctr = (uint64_t)((uint32_t)(nonce[0]) | (uint32_t)(nonce[1]) << 8 | + (uint32_t)(nonce[2]) << 16 | (uint32_t)(nonce[3]) << 24) << 32; + iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN; + + memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); + CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, + sizeof(poly1305_key), key, iv, ctr); + + CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); + poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); + CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, iv, ctr + 1); + poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, out, in_len); + poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len); + poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, in_len); + + if (tag_len != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) { + unsigned char tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN]; + CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag); + memcpy(out + in_len, tag, tag_len); + *out_len = in_len + tag_len; + return 1; + } + + CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, out + in_len); + *out_len = in_len + POLY1305_TAG_LEN; + return 1; +} + +int +aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) +{ + unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN]; + unsigned char poly1305_key[32]; + const unsigned char *iv = nonce; + poly1305_state poly1305; + const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len; + size_t plaintext_len; + uint64_t ctr = 0; + + if (in_len < tag_len) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return 0; + } + + /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block + * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow + * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time. + * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only + * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false. + * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop + * the warning. */ + if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + plaintext_len = in_len - tag_len; + + if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + + ctr = (uint64_t)((uint32_t)(nonce[0]) | (uint32_t)(nonce[1]) << 8 | + (uint32_t)(nonce[2]) << 16 | (uint32_t)(nonce[3]) << 24) << 32; + iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN; + + memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); + CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, + sizeof(poly1305_key), key, iv, ctr); + + CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); + poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); + poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len); + poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len); + poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, plaintext_len); + + CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac); + + if (timingsafe_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, tag_len) != 0) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return 0; + } + + CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, key, iv, ctr + 1); + *out_len = plaintext_len; + return 1; +} + +int +aead_xchacha20_poly1305_seal(unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) +{ + unsigned char poly1305_key[32]; + unsigned char subkey[32]; + poly1305_state poly1305; + + if (max_out_len < in_len + tag_len) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + + if (nonce_len != XCHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + CRYPTO_hchacha_20(subkey, key, nonce); + + CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, subkey, nonce + 16, 1); + + memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); + CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key), + subkey, nonce + 16, 0); + + CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); + poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); + poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, out, in_len); + poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len); + poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, in_len); + + if (tag_len != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) { + unsigned char tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN]; + CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag); + memcpy(out + in_len, tag, tag_len); + *out_len = in_len + tag_len; + return 1; + } + + CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, out + in_len); + *out_len = in_len + POLY1305_TAG_LEN; + return 1; +} + +int +aead_xchacha20_poly1305_open(unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, + const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) +{ + unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN]; + unsigned char poly1305_key[32]; + unsigned char subkey[32]; + poly1305_state poly1305; + size_t plaintext_len; + + if (in_len < tag_len) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return 0; + } + + if (nonce_len != XCHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE); + return 0; + } + + plaintext_len = in_len - tag_len; + + if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + + CRYPTO_hchacha_20(subkey, key, nonce); + + memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); + CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key), + subkey, nonce + 16, 0); + + CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); + poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); + poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len); + poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len); + poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, plaintext_len); + + CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac); + if (timingsafe_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, tag_len) != 0) { + EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return 0; + } + + CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, subkey, nonce + 16, 1); + + *out_len = plaintext_len; + return 1; +} + +#if 0 +/* RFC 7539 */ +static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = { + .key_len = 32, + .nonce_len = CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN, + .overhead = POLY1305_TAG_LEN, + .max_tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN, + + .init = aead_chacha20_poly1305_init, + .cleanup = aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup, + .seal = aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal, + .open = aead_chacha20_poly1305_open, +}; + +const EVP_AEAD * +EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305() +{ + return &aead_chacha20_poly1305; +} + +static const EVP_AEAD aead_xchacha20_poly1305 = { + .key_len = 32, + .nonce_len = XCHACHA20_NONCE_LEN, + .overhead = POLY1305_TAG_LEN, + .max_tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN, + + .init = aead_chacha20_poly1305_init, + .cleanup = aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup, + .seal = aead_xchacha20_poly1305_seal, + .open = aead_xchacha20_poly1305_open, +}; + +const EVP_AEAD * +EVP_aead_xchacha20_poly1305() +{ + return &aead_xchacha20_poly1305; +} +#endif + +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 */ -- cgit v1.2.3