From 3ef6719f47b734b12c0b11c725b7f12e3fb3c08a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Uros Majstorovic Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 14:19:26 +0200 Subject: fs layout updated --- code/crypto/e_chacha20poly1305.c | 229 --------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 229 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 code/crypto/e_chacha20poly1305.c (limited to 'code/crypto/e_chacha20poly1305.c') diff --git a/code/crypto/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/code/crypto/e_chacha20poly1305.c deleted file mode 100644 index 17fcab8..0000000 --- a/code/crypto/e_chacha20poly1305.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,229 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.15 2017/01/29 17:49:23 beck Exp $ */ - -/* - * Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floter - * Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc. - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY - * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION - * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN - * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - -#include -#include - -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) - -#include -#include -#include - -#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16 -#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD 8 - -/* - * The informational RFC 7539, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols", - * introduced a modified AEAD construction that is incompatible with the - * common style that has been already used in TLS. The IETF version also - * adds a constant (salt) that is prepended to the nonce. - */ -#define CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN 4 -#define CHACHA20_IV_LEN 8 -#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN (CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN + CHACHA20_IV_LEN) - - -static void -poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305, - const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) -{ - size_t j = data_len; - unsigned char length_bytes[8]; - unsigned i; - - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) { - length_bytes[i] = j; - j >>= 8; - } - - if (data != NULL) - CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len); - CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes)); -} - -static void -poly1305_update_with_pad16(poly1305_state *poly1305, - const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) -{ - static const unsigned char zero_pad16[16]; - size_t pad_len; - - CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len); - - /* pad16() is defined in RFC 7539 2.8.1. */ - if ((pad_len = data_len % 16) == 0) - return; - - CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, zero_pad16, 16 - pad_len); -} - -int -aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - size_t max_out_len, unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len, - const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, - const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) -{ - unsigned char poly1305_key[32]; - poly1305_state poly1305; - const unsigned char *iv; - const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len; - uint64_t ctr; - - /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block - * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow - * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time. - * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only - * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false. - * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop - * the warning. */ - if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) { - // EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); - return 0; - } - - if (max_out_len < in_len + tag_len) { - // EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); - return 0; - } - - if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD) { - /* Google's draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04, Nov 2013 */ - - memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, - sizeof(poly1305_key), key, nonce, 0); - - CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, nonce, 1); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, out, in_len); - } else if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) { - /* RFC 7539, May 2015 */ - - ctr = (uint64_t)(nonce[0] | nonce[1] << 8 | - nonce[2] << 16 | nonce[3] << 24) << 32; - iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN; - - memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, - sizeof(poly1305_key), key, iv, ctr); - - CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); - poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, iv, ctr + 1); - poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, out, in_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, in_len); - } - - if (tag_len != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) { - unsigned char tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN]; - CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag); - memcpy(out + in_len, tag, tag_len); - *out_len = in_len + tag_len; - return 1; - } - - CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, out + in_len); - *out_len = in_len + POLY1305_TAG_LEN; - return 1; -} - -int -aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - size_t max_out_len, unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len, - const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len, - const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) -{ - unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN]; - unsigned char poly1305_key[32]; - const unsigned char *iv = nonce; - poly1305_state poly1305; - const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len; - size_t plaintext_len; - uint64_t ctr = 0; - - if (in_len < tag_len) { - // EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); - return 0; - } - - /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block - * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow - * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time. - * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only - * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false. - * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop - * the warning. */ - if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) { - // EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE); - return 0; - } - - plaintext_len = in_len - tag_len; - - if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) { - // EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); - return 0; - } - - if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD) { - /* Google's draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04, Nov 2013 */ - - memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, - sizeof(poly1305_key), key, nonce, 0); - - CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len); - } else if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) { - /* RFC 7539, May 2015 */ - - ctr = (uint64_t)(nonce[0] | nonce[1] << 8 | - nonce[2] << 16 | nonce[3] << 24) << 32; - iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN; - - memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); - CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, - sizeof(poly1305_key), key, iv, ctr); - - CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key); - poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len); - poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len); - poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, plaintext_len); - } - - CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac); - - if (timingsafe_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, tag_len) != 0) { - // EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); - return 0; - } - - CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, key, iv, ctr + 1); - *out_len = plaintext_len; - return 1; -} - -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 */ -- cgit v1.2.3