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diff --git a/code/crypto/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/code/crypto/e_chacha20poly1305.c
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+/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.15 2017/01/29 17:49:23 beck Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floter <reyk@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
+
+#include <compat.h>
+#include <chacha.h>
+#include <poly1305.h>
+
+#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
+#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD 8
+
+/*
+ * The informational RFC 7539, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols",
+ * introduced a modified AEAD construction that is incompatible with the
+ * common style that has been already used in TLS.  The IETF version also
+ * adds a constant (salt) that is prepended to the nonce.
+ */
+#define CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN 4
+#define CHACHA20_IV_LEN 8
+#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN (CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN + CHACHA20_IV_LEN)
+
+
+static void
+poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305,
+    const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
+{
+	size_t j = data_len;
+	unsigned char length_bytes[8];
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
+		length_bytes[i] = j;
+		j >>= 8;
+	}
+
+	if (data != NULL)
+		CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
+	CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
+}
+
+static void
+poly1305_update_with_pad16(poly1305_state *poly1305,
+    const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
+{
+	static const unsigned char zero_pad16[16];
+	size_t pad_len;
+
+	CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
+
+	/* pad16() is defined in RFC 7539 2.8.1. */
+	if ((pad_len = data_len % 16) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, zero_pad16, 16 - pad_len);
+}
+
+int
+aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, 
+    size_t max_out_len, unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len,
+    const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+    const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
+    const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
+{
+	unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
+	poly1305_state poly1305;
+	const unsigned char *iv;
+	const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
+	uint64_t ctr;
+
+	/* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
+	 * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
+	 * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
+	 * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
+	 * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
+	 * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
+	 * the warning. */
+	if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
+		// EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (max_out_len < in_len + tag_len) {
+		// EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD) {
+		/* Google's draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04, Nov 2013 */
+
+		memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+		CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
+		    sizeof(poly1305_key), key, nonce, 0);
+
+		CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
+		poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
+		CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, nonce, 1);
+		poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, out, in_len);
+	} else if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
+		/* RFC 7539, May 2015 */
+
+		ctr = (uint64_t)(nonce[0] | nonce[1] << 8 |
+		    nonce[2] << 16 | nonce[3] << 24) << 32;
+		iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN;
+
+		memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+		CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
+		    sizeof(poly1305_key), key, iv, ctr);
+
+		CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
+		poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
+		CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, iv, ctr + 1);
+		poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, out, in_len);
+		poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len);
+		poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, in_len);
+	}
+
+	if (tag_len != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
+		unsigned char tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
+		CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag);
+		memcpy(out + in_len, tag, tag_len);
+		*out_len = in_len + tag_len;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, out + in_len);
+	*out_len = in_len + POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int
+aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, 
+    size_t max_out_len, unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len,
+    const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+    const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
+    const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
+{
+	unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
+	unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
+	const unsigned char *iv = nonce;
+	poly1305_state poly1305;
+	const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
+	size_t plaintext_len;
+	uint64_t ctr = 0;
+
+	if (in_len < tag_len) {
+		// EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
+	 * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
+	 * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
+	 * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
+	 * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
+	 * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
+	 * the warning. */
+	if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
+		// EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	plaintext_len = in_len - tag_len;
+
+	if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
+		// EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD) {
+		/* Google's draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04, Nov 2013 */
+
+		memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+		CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
+		    sizeof(poly1305_key), key, nonce, 0);
+
+		CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
+		poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
+		poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
+	} else if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
+		/* RFC 7539, May 2015 */
+
+		ctr = (uint64_t)(nonce[0] | nonce[1] << 8 |
+		    nonce[2] << 16 | nonce[3] << 24) << 32;
+		iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN;
+
+		memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+		CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
+		    sizeof(poly1305_key), key, iv, ctr);
+
+		CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
+		poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
+		poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
+		poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len);
+		poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, plaintext_len);
+	}
+
+	CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);
+
+	if (timingsafe_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, tag_len) != 0) {
+		// EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, key, iv, ctr + 1);
+	*out_len = plaintext_len;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 */