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/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.15 2017/01/29 17:49:23 beck Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floter <reyk@openbsd.org>
* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
#include <compat.h>
#include <chacha.h>
#include <poly1305.h>
#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD 8
/*
* The informational RFC 7539, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols",
* introduced a modified AEAD construction that is incompatible with the
* common style that has been already used in TLS. The IETF version also
* adds a constant (salt) that is prepended to the nonce.
*/
#define CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN 4
#define CHACHA20_IV_LEN 8
#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN (CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN + CHACHA20_IV_LEN)
static void
poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
{
size_t j = data_len;
unsigned char length_bytes[8];
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
length_bytes[i] = j;
j >>= 8;
}
if (data != NULL)
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
}
static void
poly1305_update_with_pad16(poly1305_state *poly1305,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
{
static const unsigned char zero_pad16[16];
size_t pad_len;
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
/* pad16() is defined in RFC 7539 2.8.1. */
if ((pad_len = data_len % 16) == 0)
return;
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, zero_pad16, 16 - pad_len);
}
int
aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
{
unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
poly1305_state poly1305;
const unsigned char *iv;
const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
uint64_t ctr;
/* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
* counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
* individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
* in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
* 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
* Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
* the warning. */
if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
// EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_len < in_len + tag_len) {
// EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD) {
/* Google's draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04, Nov 2013 */
memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
sizeof(poly1305_key), key, nonce, 0);
CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, nonce, 1);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, out, in_len);
} else if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
/* RFC 7539, May 2015 */
ctr = (uint64_t)(nonce[0] | nonce[1] << 8 |
nonce[2] << 16 | nonce[3] << 24) << 32;
iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN;
memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
sizeof(poly1305_key), key, iv, ctr);
CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, iv, ctr + 1);
poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, out, in_len);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, in_len);
}
if (tag_len != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
unsigned char tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag);
memcpy(out + in_len, tag, tag_len);
*out_len = in_len + tag_len;
return 1;
}
CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, out + in_len);
*out_len = in_len + POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
return 1;
}
int
aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, unsigned char key[32], unsigned char tag_len,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
{
unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
const unsigned char *iv = nonce;
poly1305_state poly1305;
const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
size_t plaintext_len;
uint64_t ctr = 0;
if (in_len < tag_len) {
// EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
/* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
* counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
* individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
* in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
* 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
* Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
* the warning. */
if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
// EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
plaintext_len = in_len - tag_len;
if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
// EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN_OLD) {
/* Google's draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04, Nov 2013 */
memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
sizeof(poly1305_key), key, nonce, 0);
CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
} else if (nonce_len == CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
/* RFC 7539, May 2015 */
ctr = (uint64_t)(nonce[0] | nonce[1] << 8 |
nonce[2] << 16 | nonce[3] << 24) << 32;
iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN;
memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
sizeof(poly1305_key), key, iv, ctr);
CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, plaintext_len);
}
CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);
if (timingsafe_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, tag_len) != 0) {
// EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, key, iv, ctr + 1);
*out_len = plaintext_len;
return 1;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 */
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